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AC/RC INTEGRATION PROGRAMS -WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE TO KEEP THEM RELEVANT
Total Force is no longer a 'concept'; it is now the Total Force Policy which integrates the Active, Reserve and Guard forces into a homogeneous whole. On the other hand RC personnel often stereotype AC forces as arrogant and bloodthirsty who don't have a firm understanding of the "real world". These biases and stereotypes totally misrepresents RC and AC capabilities, but have proven to be barriers to effective component integration. These biases have lessened, but have not been eliminated since the inception of the Total Force Policy. This is a critical time for change in the Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) integration programs. Because the Army is transforming, future AC/RC integration programs need to focus on supporting the future force. If the current programs are not updated and redesigned to serve the Army's transformational efforts, then they will become irrelevant. The timing is right for the development and implementation of far-reaching transformational programs that significantly increase the effectiveness of AC/RC integration. With our current wartime focus and transformational efforts, we have a great opportunity for significant positive changes in our integration programs.
However, these changes will require significant attitudinal changes from both components to be effective. They must also contribute significantly to transformation. We must be prepared to support any force structure that may be developed as we transform our Army, regardless of cultural biases. Both components must be prepared to support whatever actions are necessary in order to be able to defend against the asymmetrical enemy that we face today.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Reserve forces are our strongest link to the American people. All of our integration programs must focus on support to the future force. We must review our current programs, retain and modify those that remain relevant to the future force, discard those programs that transformation will make irrelevant, and implement new programs that will help our Army transform to the Total Force. Currently it seems the RC cannot effectively support this program, which may put the program in jeopardy. Unfortunately, this inability to support the program with qualified officers on the part of the RC may tend to contribute to the AC bias of the RC as not a truly professional organization.
CURRENT AC/RC PROGRAMS
Overall the AC/RC Commander exchange program effectively targets one of the major barriers with total integration, the issue of cultural biases. It is a low cost program that is flexible enough to remain relevant regardless of force structure changes within the components.
Unfortunately, it does not greatly affect either of the components due to its limited scope.
TRAINING SUPPORT XXI
The Training Support XXI concept was conceived in March 1997 and implemented in
October 1999 as a result of the FY-93 National Defense Authorization Act. 13 importantly, many of these AC support personnel will be transferred back into AC units upon completion of their TSD tours. In their new duty assignments they will be able to inform their AC comrades on the issues and challenges associated with RC manning and training.
The "cross pollination" acquired during these AC/RC tours has helped to significantly reduce some of the negative AC biases regarding their RC counterparts. Training Support XXI has significantly assisted AC/RC integration, with far-reaching effects. This program will be affected by future force structure changes. To remain relevant, it must be restructured along with all of the RC units to remain postured to assist them both during and after final restructuring. FTS personnel, in all their roles, have provided the critical link between the AC and the RC since their inception. In most cases, they are funded by the RC and incorporated in the RC organizational structure; but they provide the full time ability to review doctrine, resource training and conduct planning to ensure that RC units are ready to complete their wartime missions.
MULTI-COMPONENT UNITS
GAO studies have affirmed the administration and effectiveness of the FTS program. 17 Their studies cite various issues and resource constraints, but they consistently conclude that effective full time manning in RC units is the key to readiness. They have found a direct relationship exists between the number of full time personnel assigned to a unit and the readiness status of that unit. Nonetheless, the program poses some persistent problems.
• With a mixed full time work force, authority for day-to-day supervision is often vague or contrary to military/civilian rank structure. 18 The concept of teaming/partnership should remain valid throughout the transformational changes of the future. Its actual structure and participants, however, will change as the Army continues to transform. Teaming opportunities and relationships should be considered during development of the AC/RC unit-mix, with geographical proximity a major consideration.
WHAT EFFECT WILL TRANSFORMATION HAVE ON AC/RC INTEGRATION?
The balance of capabilities in the active and reserve components today is not the best for the future.
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 Donald Rumsfeld
As the Army reviews its lessons learned from recent mobilizations and deployments and continues to transform, many changes to AC/RC integration programs are on the horizon.
Secretary Rumsfeld directed the military leadership to rebalance the AC/RC force mix. 27 DoD guidance will significantly impact current unit structures as well as the mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support units within both components. Restructuring may well continue with an ongoing cap on active force strength, perhaps with reduced strength.
In order to remain relevant and support the future strategy, the Army must develop integration programs that will proactively support ongoing transformation initiatives. Programs that remain rigid until transformation actions are complete will become irrelevant. Future AC/RC integration programs need to meet the emerging conditions for transformation. They can do this by being flexible and anticipating change that will complement the Army's future force structure.
There are a number of ways that transformation will affect AC/RC integration:
• Transformational initiative creates an environment that is conducive to far sweeping changes. Changes to integration programs should be revolutionary. If we persist with the evolutionary changes to AC/RC integration that have been used in the past, the speed of transformation will quickly make them irrelevant.
• Elimination of redundant programs will be the norm. Interdependence among all components will be a hallmark of the transformed force. Army components can no longer protect programs because of simple political support or through turf battles.
• Force structural changes will affect organizationally based integration programs.
Current AC/RC programs, no matter how effective today, that are based solely on unit structure are at risk. Changes in AC/RC mix may negate some initiatives such as Force XXI Heavy Division redesign, Integrated Divisions and Integrated Light infantry Battalions.
• Dedicated funding for AC/RC integration programs has not been available in the past, so RC Units have funded initiatives out of their current budgets. After paying for the current operations associated with the GWOT and fencing money for transformation and operations, there will be little left over for AC/RC programs that are not integral to the transformation process. Additionally, those AC/RC integration initiatives that are not resource-intensive have a better chance for implementation.
• Transformation requires a Total Force in the purest sense. There will be no place in the transformed Army for residual cultural biases or parochial allegiances.
Because of this, integration programs that target this bias will be the most effective and support transformational efforts most completely.
During this unprecedented time of transformation, the Total Army concept should be central to all facets of planning and change within the military. Transformation makes AC/RC integration a target of opportunity.
SO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? POSSIBLE CHANGES
The Army components must be supported, resourced, and modernized as one fully and completely integrated team.
 GEN Dennis Reimer
We have a number of options to expand AC/RC integration and simultaneously support transformational change within the armed forces. Some current programs should be maintained and improved. Others, good as though they were, will be rendered irrelevant by future force structure changes. Some programs and systems need to be developed to help set the conditions for positive transformational AC/RC integration change rather than simply reacting to it.
New integration programs should be developed and adapted consistent with the following assumptions:
• Implement integration programs that are in synch with the transformation process.
• Programs should target areas that will be affected least by change in organizational structure and redistribution of capabilities among the components.
• Programs should target barriers to total integration. Initiatives that target the reduction of historic AC/RC biases will be the most effective in fostering long-term, positive change.
• Improvement and maintenance of RC readiness must be the overall goal of any integration program. The RC must remain relevant and ready to support contingencies.
• Programs must cut out redundancies within the components. Sleeker, more agile organizations will be the norm -not only in equipment, but also in personnel systems.
• Identify corps areas that will not change during transformation and target their refinement.
• Continue full-time support to RC units. These personnel must more effectively support the force both pre-and post-mobilization.
• Programs should focus on developing a homogenous team of all components, thereby finally achieving the pure Total Force that was conceived in 1973.
• Programs should leverage the impetus of transformation to undertake some farreaching and significant changes.
Some specific AC/RC integration programs that should be continued or considered further are described in the following pages. These programs will support the Army's transformation efforts; they are far-reaching; they can take advantage of the impetus and futuristic thinking of transformation.
UPDATE THE FULL TIME SUPPORT (FTS) MANNING PROGRAM
Update the Reserve FTS Manning Program by removing MILTECs and DA Civilians from deployable units and filling their positions with AC or AGR Soldiers. Filling all FTS slots with AC or AGR Soldiers, rather than a mix of uniformed personnel and civilians, will resolve a number of issues associated with the command and control and deployablity of units. This modification of the FTS system within the RC will enhance this important and far-reaching program and better posture RC units for improved readiness.
This program would have a number of benefits to the force:
• Maintaining an on-going rotation of uniformed FTS personnel in each deployable unit thus keeping the AC/RC bond updated.
• Ensures that all FTS personnel mobilize with their associated unit.
• Eliminates conflicting lines of authority that many times exists with a mixture of DA civilians and uniformed (AGR/AC) full time staff.
• Eliminates overlap of responsibilities between civilian FTS staff and TPU soldiers.
Issues associated with the program:
• Redistribution of civilian FTS is both expensive and time consuming (if retirement and "grandfathering" is part of the implementation process).
• Requires movement of DA civilians and MILTECs from deployable units to support positions.
• The program will have costs; but there will be some cost savings realized from replacing lower grade civilian personnel with junior NCOs and Soldiers. Thus the personnel system has already postured itself to support this concept.
This program would offer a number of benefits to the force:
• It affects the single most important readiness factor for the RC, full time manning.
• It gives Reserve units a clearer picture of current active force training and operational requirements.
• It helps to break down the stereotypes that persist between the components.
Soldiers and officers would serve tours in both AC and RC units throughout their career. The parochial view associated with various components would start to diminish as would the "us versus them" mentality. Issues associated with the program:
• Personnel rating systems and senior rater profiling must be reviewed to eliminate favoritism toward any component.
• Currently all required AGR positions are not filled. Filling these positions will require great support from the AC which may even involve force structure increase.
This program puts our personnel system on the track to a totally integrated system and reduces the redundancy of two full time personnel management systems. It also sets the conditions for a total elimination of the AGR program with its integration into the AC personnel system.
CONSOLIDATION OF AC AND AGR PERSONNEL SYSTEMS
Total consolidation of the AC and AGR personnel systems by the elimination of the AGR personnel system is the next step toward total integration. Under this proposed system all full time military personnel would serve as AC soldiers. The AGR system, as currently organized, would cease to exist. This consolidation is radical and politically volatile, but it fundamentally serves AC/RC integration in the future force.
This program would offer a number of benefits to the force
• Most far-reaching of all proposed integration programs.
• Focused on changing mindset of soldiers at all levels.
• Streamlines personnel system, reducing the redundancy of two full time personnel systems.
• The priority of fill to all full time positions would need to be strictly controlled.
Possibly the percentages (or numbers) may need to be stipulated by law to prevent a higher percentage filling of AC units to the detriment of already severely undermanned full time RC positions.
• We must maintain a process for integration of qualified TPU soldier volunteers back on to active duty in order to maintain soldier strength in all grades.
• Consideration would require significant changes to Army regulations and Law.
A total integration of the AC and AGR personnel system would bring us as close to the Total Force concept as any other integration program. Reduction in redundant personnel systems will also benefit the transformation process. should be combined with the integration of AC and AGR tours. In fact, given the inability of the RC to support the program with TPU drilling reservists and subsequent filling of slots with AGR officers, this program has already devolved into an AGR/AC exchange.
MULTI-COMPONENT UNITS
Multi-Component Units have proven themselves, so they should be retained and modified to support the future force. The program may be somewhat dormant prior to major AC/RC force structure changes. The concept of multi-component units needs to remain a central theme as the AC/RC mix is changed to meet Secretary Rumsfeld's restructuring guidance.
BARRIERS TO CHANGE
Significant changes to the force structure and mindset of the Army does not come easily.
This resistance was most evident during implementation of the Total Force Policy. Very few military leaders supported the policy, and many expressed their concerns publicly. It was not until the program was made into law by the Congress and implemented that the services accepted and supported the program. However, the provisions of the policy are currently considered by most to have significantly improved the capability and interoperability of the forces. Now is the time to make significant changes in the way that we operate. In order to make a significant positive impact on the system and move closer to the end state of a purely Total Force, we must make transformational and sweeping changes. Because some changes may affect "rice bowls" and program control, both our military and civilian leadership, as well as our lawmakers, must openly and unequivocally support real change:
• Cultural Barriers -The cultural barriers that have historically existed between the components have been the most significant barriers to change. If these barriers can be eliminated, or even reduced, many more options may be open for AC/RC integration in the future.
• Resources -There will be some windfalls from reductions in redundant systems and other efficiencies as we move closer to a Total Force. Initially there will be a requirement for additional resources such as additional paid manpower days for the RC units in their support of AC operations.
• Laws and Regulations -Legal and regulatory changes must keep pace with the Army's transformation initiative. New programs that bog down awaiting legal support may become irrelevant even before implementation. Title 10 and Title 32 United States Code must be reviewed and changed as necessary to keep pace with transformational integration programs. Many of the changes will only be implemented through the power of law. Without this type of implementation, no sweeping and lasting changes will be possible.
• Lobby influence from Reserve Forces -In order to realize savings in the personnel area through reduction of redundant systems, the RC should give up some control of their full time manning personnel system. Political barriers, especially associated with the National Guard, have proven to be great barriers in the past.
• Troop Caps and Manning levels -Army Programs that require an increase to AC end strength are susceptible to quick rejection. Each requested increase in end strength must be totally based on mission requirement.
• Component Cultures -This is one of the hardest barriers to overcome. Centuries of traditions in the specific components provide a great barrier to transformational change.
• RC Duty Stereotype -The Army must change the mind set that duty with the RC is the "Kiss of Death". Participation in many integration programs has in the past had detrimental impacts on AC Soldiers' and officers' careers. The Army must continue to ensure that participation in these programs does not negatively impact careers of either AC or RC soldiers.
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CONCLUSION
The Army cannot wait for the fog of transformation to clear to plan for future integration of the components. By maintaining relevant integration programs, by updating them as necessary, and by changing some of the basic principles of Army personnel management, we will be better postured to support the future force. In particular, we need to target integration at the basic unit of an Army organization, the Soldier. As we integrate at this level, we will start to change the mindset that has existed since the inception of the Reserve forces and enable Soldiers, of all components, to better understand the issues and requirements for a Total Force.
This greater understanding will help to integrate the units like no other program. Likewise, new and updated programs and policies will enable us to come closer to the Total Force concept and maintain the readiness of our ever shrinking armed forces.
In the past, the Army has designed its programs to better integrate the RC into the AC structure. The Army is currently pursuing integration on an initiative-by-initiative basis. There is no overarching plan to guide the multiple efforts. 30 Integration plans do not specify how integration (or the Total Force) will assist the Army in its goal of achieving the correct balance of reserve and active forces that will be able to meet the country's defense requirements. 31 Now, as the Army is transforming, we need to modify that approach. Integration programs need to target biases at the lowest level: They must show the RC how to function with the AC, as well as teach the AC about the requirements and constraints of the Reserve forces.
Better implementations of full time manning systems within the reserves, coupled with a total integration of the AGR and AC personnel system, will not only improve unit readiness and target redundant systems but also subdue the key enemy of integration, a negative bias between the components. This change will trigger far-reaching positive effects; but will also meet resistance and therefore prove difficult to implement. The Army must use the overarching impetus of transformation and current requirements of the GWOT to break down barriers to this needed change.
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